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The Effect of Paid Preparer Competition on Individual Tax Avoidance 
 
 
 
Abstract:  This study considers how competition among paid preparers affects individual tax 
avoidance. Merging individual tax return data reported to the IRS at the county level with 
household income reported by the U.S Census Bureau, along with supply of paid preparer 
establishments from the National Employment Time Series (“NETS”) database, we observe that 
paid preparer competition is positively associated with underreporting of income, consistent with 
competition facilitating client appeasement for avoiding more taxes. Our results are robust to 
various proxies for paid preparer competition and tax avoidance. In additional analysis, we note 
that our findings are stronger in counties whose taxpayers more frequently engage a paid 
preparer and among establishments that do not purport to be a CPA firm. This study contributes 
to our understanding of how competition impacts financial intermediaries’ decision-making and 
the environmental factors affecting paid tax preparers’ recommendations.  
 
Keywords: paid preparer competition; individual tax avoidance
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines how competition in the paid preparer market affects individual tax 
avoidance. While the government typically has an interest in facilitating market competition to 
promote consumer welfare, it is also concerned about preserving the tax base. As paid preparers 
recommend filing positions for their clients, it is important to understand how competition in this 
market affects taxpayer reporting.  
Ex ante, increased competition may stoke concerns about client retention and encourage 
paid preparers to promote, or acquiesce to, clientele tax avoidance in order to satisfy client 
preferences for paying less tax. If competition increases the value placed on client appeasement, 
we would expect greater paid preparer competition to be associated with more underreporting of 
income, our primary proxy of tax avoidance.  
Although prior research documents various factors affecting paid preparers’ decision-
making (Roberts 1998), it has not addressed how the market for their services influences the 
returns they prepare. Extant research on external auditors and rating agencies provide mixed 
evidence as to how competition in these markets affects the underlying audit or ratings quality 
respectively (e.g. Newton et al. 2013; Boone et al. 2012; Becker and Milbourn 2011; Lizzeri 
1999). While the paid preparer market similarly involves a financial intermediary who must 
balance incentives to appease client preferences with reputational concerns, paid preparers are 
unique in both the work they perform and the advisory role they assume. Moreover, a majority of 
taxpayers use a paid preparer (IRS 2016), underscoring the economically meaningful impact 
these agents have on the government’s tax receipts. 
 To identify individual tax avoidance, we follow Boone et al. (2013) by comparing the 
aggregate county-wide adjusted gross income (“AGI”) reported to the IRS (per the IRS Statistics 
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of Income (“SOI”) database) with aggregate county-wide household income reported by the U.S. 
Census (per the American Community Survey). We merge this dataset for years 2005 – 2013 
with the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) database that identifies the number of 
accounting establishments at the zip code level, as well as the number of employees at each 
establishment. We use the number of establishments (natural log and scaled by population) in a 
county and market concentration, derived through a Herfindahl index, as our proxies for paid 
preparer competition.  
 Controlling for demographic and macroeconomic characteristics, as well as county and 
year fixed effects, we find that paid preparer competition is positively associated with individual 
tax avoidance. Economically, a ten percent increase in the number of accounting establishments 
translates to a $7.0 M  increase in under-reported income for the average county in our sample. 
Our results are robust to measuring tax avoidance as the average tax liability or effective tax rate 
(“ETR”) in a county. Further, our results are stronger in counties whose taxpayers more 
frequently engage a paid preparer and among paid preparers that do not purport to be a CPA 
firm.  
 An alternative explanation for our results is that competition facilitates more benign 
forms of tax avoidance that do not necessarily require paid preparers to promote or acquiesce to 
underreporting through aggressive positions. Consistent with this explanation, we find that paid 
preparer competition is positively associated with the percentage of taxpayers reporting 
Individual Retirement Account (“IRA”) contributions, a tax-minimizing strategy created by the 
government to incentive retirement savings. We also find paid preparer competition is positively 
associated with earned income credit (“EITC”) credit claims and interpret this result as capturing 
some benign tax avoidance, where paid preparers may alert eligible clients about credits they 
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might not otherwise claim, as well as more aggressive avoidance, where paid preparers may 
facilitate credit claims for ineligible clients. Similarly, we find competition is positively 
associated with the magnitude of charitable contribution deductions, which may reflect paid 
preparer acquiescence to aggressive taxpayer preferences.    
 Lastly, we consider whether taxpayer demand for tax avoidance, as opposed to the 
supply of paid preparers, may be driving our result. To the extent paid preparers choose to 
operate in counties with greater opportunities for tax avoidance, our observed effect may instead 
be capturing an unobserved demand for tax avoidance. To address this concern, we include a 
control capturing counties whose taxpayers more frequently report business income, a proxy for 
greater tax planning opportunities. Our inferences remain unchanged when including this 
control. To the extent other unobserved characteristics reflect a county’s demand for tax 
avoidance, we expect the county fixed effects in our models to capture such a construct. This 
paper contributes to at least two streams of literature. First, we provide descriptive information 
about the extent of competition among accounting establishments. To our knowledge, we are the 
first study to examine variation in the supply of accounting services available to individual 
taxpayers and small businesses at a local level. While we document how competition among 
these service providers manifests in more tax avoidance, we believe there may be other 
consequences worthy of study, given the various parties interested in the information accounting 
establishments help produce. This research should be of interest to academics and regulators who 
study competition among financial intermediaries more broadly.  
Second, we add to the literature that considers environmental factors affecting paid 
preparer decision-making. Our results suggest competition intensifies paid preparers’ desire to 
appease client preferences. As policy makers grapple with the costs and benefits of regulating 
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paid preparers in a way that could impact marketplace competition (Versprille and Lee 2019), we 
believe our findings should be informative to this debate.  
 We organize the remainder of this paper as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and 
motivates our hypothesis, Section 3 presents our model and main results, Section 4 discusses 
additional analysis, and Section 5 concludes.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 In his review of tax accountants’ judgment and decision-making (“JDM”) research, 
Roberts (1998) identifies how psychological, environmental, task, processing, and context 
factors influence paid preparers’ information search, legal interpretation, and recommendations 
to clients. Prior studies document that environmental factors such as IRS enforcement (e.g., 
Cuccia 1994; Kaplan et al. 1988; Newberry et al. 1993), legal ambiguity (Spilker et al. 1999), 
and client preferences (Duncan et al. 1989; Cloyd 1995; Cloyd and Spilker 1999) affect paid 
preparer conclusions. Moreover, Collins et al. (1990) note that client preferences for minimizing 
tax, consistent with taxpayers’ wealth maximizing utility function derived from Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972), is a determinant in paid preparer use.  
Roberts (1998) also posits that the economic importance of a client can incentivize paid 
preparers to facilitate tax avoidance in order to satisfy client preferences. Recent studies, 
however, provide mixed evidence of this behavior (Reckers et al. 1991; Bobek et al. 2010; 
Bandy et al. 1994; Vermeer et al. 2019). While these aforementioned studies employ 
experimental methods in a laboratory setting to evaluate the effects of client importance on 
specific decisions made by paid preparers, our study uses archival data to evaluate the effects of 
paid preparer market competition on aggregate tax return reporting.   
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Research examining how competition impacts financial intermediaries such as paid 
preparers is generally confined to the credit ratings agency (“CRA”) and external auditor 
spheres, where the identities of these service providers is more easily accessible. Bolton et al. 
(2012) develop a model showing that competition exacerbates “ratings shopping” by issuing 
companies that may lead to less informative ratings. Becker and Milbourn (2011) find empirical 
evidence consistent with this proposition that competition among CRAs coincides with a 
deterioration in ratings quality. Moreover, Lee et al. (2019) propose that CRA competition 
encourages firm misreporting and can impair investment efficiency, Faure-Grimaud et al. (2009) 
argue that competition can reduce information disclosure, and Goel and Thakor (2015) note that 
competition increases ratings coarseness. On the other hand, Lizzeri (1999), though not referring 
to CRAs specifically, develops a model suggesting competition among certification 
intermediaries can lead to full information revelation.    
Similar to ratings shopping in the CRA marketplace, competition among auditors can 
lead to clients soliciting favorable opinions in their financial statements. Lennox (2000) provides 
evidence of clients successfully engaging in this phenomenon in the U.K., while Newton et al. 
(2016) find similar practices in the U.S. for clean internal control opinions, primarily in 
competitive markets. Besides influencing the underlying opinion, pressures to appease clients in 
a competitive market can also impact auditors’ tolerance of client accounting practices. For 
instance, Newton et al. (2013) observe that restatements are increasing in city level auditor 
competition, consistent with client retention concerns leading to a lenient audit and acquiescence 
to client reporting preferences. At the same time, Boone et al. (2012) find that audit competition 
reduces client earnings management, suggesting competition reduces auditor complacency and 
promotes audit quality. Moreover, Francis et al. (2013) find that the concentration of audits 
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conducted by the Big 4 accounting firms relative to all other accounting firms is associated with 
higher quality company earnings in a country, while concentration of audits within the Big 4 
accounting firms is associated with lower quality earnings. Overall, the evidence is still unclear 
regarding the relationship between competition and accountants’ decision-making in the audit 
sphere.   
 We believe there are critical differences between the CRA and audit markets and the paid 
preparer market. For one, while auditors and CRAs are supposed to be independent in order to 
provide objective information to external stakeholders, tax preparers are supposed to be 
advocates who assist their clients in ensuring they do not pay more taxes than legally owed 
(AICPA 2018). Further, these intermediaries face different monitoring environments from 
government agencies. While the SEC regulates CRAs and auditors of publicly held companies in 
order to protect outside investors, federal and state treasury departments review the output of a 
tax preparer’s work in order to protect the government’s revenue base. Lastly, the fundamental 
nature of work tax preparers perform is different. While auditors attest to whether a client’s 
financial statements accord to generally accepted accounting principles and ratings analysts 
assess the client’s ability to timely repay its debt, tax preparers advise clients based on their 
interpretation of relevant tax law. Therefore, although client retention and reputational concerns 
exist across all these sectors, differences in the objective roles served, regulatory environments, 
and nature of the work make studying the influence of competition on paid preparers’ decision-
making processes unique.  
 We believe increased paid preparer market competition can increase pressure on client 
retention or obtainment if paid preparers rationalize they will lose the client to a competing 
preparer if they do not support a client’s preference for paying less tax. In a survey of paid 
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preparers, Fogarty and Jones (2014) note that just about every respondent characterized 
themselves as moderately aggressive within the band of their colleagues. This finding suggests 
paid preparers consider their competitors’ behavior when formulating their own risk tolerance.  
The threat of losing a client can manifest in greater efforts by paid preparers to 
recommend, or acquiesce to, tax positions that minimize a client’s tax liability. For instance, 
increased competition might encourage paid preparers to rely selectively on client favorable case 
law, interpret ambiguous fact patterns in a more client favorable manner, or act less skeptically 
when presented with questionable information from the client. Therefore, if competition 
intensifies paid preparers’ pressure to satisfy client preferences, we would expect them to 
recommend tax-reducing positions on their clients’ returns. We state our hypothesis formally as 
follows: 
Hypothesis: Paid preparer competition is positively associated with individual tax 
avoidance.  
 
 There are various reasons increased competition in the paid preparer market would not 
facilitate greater  tax avoidance. For instance, extant literature suggests clients have varying risk 
attitudes that affect tax preparer decision-making (e.g., Cuccia et al. 1995; Cloyd 1995). If clients 
prefer to avoid scrutiny from the tax authority at the expense of tax savings, competition would 
be unlikely to incentivize paid preparers to advocate more tax avoidance. 
Morevoer, competition may increase the consequences to paid preparers of promoting tax 
avoidance. Should a monitoring agency, or competitor, identify noncompliance in a paid 
preparer’s recommendations, the reputation costs would likely be greater in a competitive market 
as the paid preparer struggles to retain its current clientele or attract new business. This 
reputational threat may encourage paid preparers to be more diligent in their work by performing 
more objective information searches and more comprehensively considering case law to address 
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ambiguities in client fact patterns, both of which should offset any biases to appease client 
preferences. Relatedly, a competitive market place can incentivize paid preparers to build their 
technical expertise of the tax law in order to attract clients seeking solutions to more complex 
cases. To the extent increased expertise results in more objective tax advice, competition might 
actually decrease tax avoidance. Consistent with degree of expertise influencing paid preparer 
decision-making, Cuccia (1994) finds that CPAs offer less client favorable recommendations 
than non-CPAs. Finally, a competitive market could make it harder for paid preparers to absorb 
the monetary penalties of noncompliant positions, constraining these intermediaries’ willingness 
to promote questionable positions to avoid tax.1   
III. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Measuring tax avoidance among individuals, absent access to IRS audit results, is 
empirically challenging. We follow Boone et al. (2013) by comparing taxpayer aggregate 
county-wide adjusted gross income (“AGI”) reported to the IRS (per the IRS Statistics of Income 
(“SOI”) database) to household aggregate county-wide income reported by the U.S. Census (per 
the annual American Community Survey).2 Specifically, we subtract AGI reported to the IRS 
from income reported by the U.S. Census and scale this difference by income reported by the 
U.S. Census. This proxy, UNDERREPORT, intends to capture the fraction of income not 
reported to the IRS in county j in year t and therefore represents our construct of individual tax 
avoidance. We believe counties represent a reasonable geographic parameter that taxpayers use 
when searching for a tax preparer, making it appropriate to conduct our analysis at this level.  
                                                 
1 IRC Section 6694 imposes a minimum $5,000 penalty on paid preparers for any willful attempt to understate a 
taxpayer’s liability. There are additional penalties for promoting abusive tax shelters (Section 6700), aiding and 
abetting an understatement of tax liability (Section 6701), and unauthorized disclosure or use of returns (Section 
6713).   
2 The aggregate county file in the SOI also includes the number of returns, personal exemptions, and selected 
components of income totals.  
11 
 
Boone et al. (2013) identify some limitations of this underreporting measure, including 
variations between each database’s definition of income, the reference period over which it is 
measured, and the population covered. The ACS is a nationwide survey that collects data by 
asking respondents on an ongoing monthly basis for household income over the past 12 months 
in counties with populations greater than 65,000. Moreover, the income information solicited 
includes both taxable and tax-exempt sources of income and the respondents solicited may not 
have tax filing obligations. We do not, however, expect any of these variations to induce 
systematic measurement error in the observed relation between UNDERREPORT and paid 
preparer competition. Nevertheless, in additional analysis, we utilize alternate proxies of tax 
avoidance that do not rely on ACS data.  
  We measure paid preparer competition in three ways using data on accounting 
establishments from the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) database, which reports the 
name, location, sales, and employment of business establishments from Duns Marketing 
Information. We consider establishments in SIC codes 7291 (tax return preparation services) and 
8721 (accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping) for purposes of our analysis and aggregate zip 
code level detail to the county level.3 Our first proxy, NUM_FIRMS, is the log of the number of 
accounting establishments in a given county. Our second proxy, NUM_FIRMS_SCALED, is the 
number of accounting establishments in a given county scaled by the number of returns filed in 
that county, available through the IRS SOI database. Our third proxy, HHI, is a Herfindahl index, 
where we use the number of employees to capture market share of accounting establishments in 
a county. We use number of employees, rather than sales, because sales are estimated figures 
based on employees for over 90 percent of the NETS population. We compute the Herfindahl 
                                                 
3 We ignore establishments that do not report having any employees or sales. If there are multiple establishments of 
a single business in a county, we aggregate the number of employees and only count that establishment once.   
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index by squaring the fraction of employees at an establishment to total employees in a county 
and summing this squared fraction across all establishments in a county. We multiply this value 
by -1 so that our proxy is increasing in competition. We restrict establishments to those with less 
than 50 employees when measuring each of these proxies because the larger establishments, 
including each of the Big-4 accounting firms, likely derive most of their business from services 
other than individual tax preparation.4 
We expect competition for tax return preparation services to increase as the number of 
service providers increases. To the extent increased competition encourages service providers to 
recommend, or acquiesce to, clientele tax avoidance, we expect a positive association between 
our proxies for competition and under-reporting of income.  
We control for a host of economic and demographic characteristics in a county generally 
following Boone et al. (2013). From the SOI database, we control for the natural log of the 
average AGI in a county (INCOME) and natural log of number of returns filed 
(NUM_TAXPAYERS), intended to capture the county’s size. From the ACS database, we control 
for the fraction of married households (MARRIED), the fraction of persons with a bachelor’s 
degree (EDUCATION), the fraction of persons age 70 or older (ELDERLY), the poverty rate 
(POVERTY), and median age (AGE).5 We also control for county-level unemployment 
(UNEMPLOYMENT) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the natural log of state level GDP 
                                                 
4 This truncates about one percent of establishments in the NETS database. Our results, when using NUM_FIRMS 
and NUM_FIRMS_SCALED as the variable of interest, are similar when including the larger establishments; 
however, their inclusion distorts the measurement of HHI.   
5 We do not control for religiosity, Boone et al.’s (2013) variable of interest, because the authors measure it via 
linear interpolation from data available in 2000 and 2010. Because our sample extends beyond 2010, we are not able 
to reliably interpolate county-level religiosity beyond this year. Further, the ACS survey does not provide data on 
MARRIED in 2013 for approximately nine percent of our sample. Where this year is missing, we replace it with the 
fraction of married households in 2012.  
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(GDP) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (“BEA”).6 Finally, we include county (λ) and 
year (γ) fixed effects to control for demographic characteristics and macroeconomic trends not 
captured by our other controls that plausibly impact individual tax avoidance. We present our 
model formally below, where competition (COMPETITION) is alternately measured as 
NUM_FIRMS, NUM_FIRMS_SCALED, or HHI: 
UNDERREPORTj,t = β0 + β1*COMPETITIONj,t + β2*INCOMEj,t + β3*NUM_TAXPAYERSj,t + 
β4*MARRIEDj,t + β5*ELDERLYj,t + β6*EDUCATIONj,t + β7*POVERTYj,t + β8*AGEj,t + 
β9*UNEMPLOYMENTj,t + β10*GDPj,t + λj + γt   (1) 
 Our sample includes 7,115 unique county-year observations from 2005 – 2013. We begin 
our sample in 2005 when the ACS household income data is first available and end our sample in 
2013 because we do not have data on accounting establishments beyond this year.7 We present 
descriptive statistics of the variables in our model in Table 1. The average (median) county has 
5.1 (6.1) percent under-reported income with average (median) AGI of $54,215 ($51,142).8 The 
average (median) county has 230 (96) unique accounting establishments and 133,618 (67,010) 
taxpayers.9 Though there are far more accounting establishments than audit firms or ratings 
agencies, we still believe variation in the number of establishments provides meaningful 
variation in competition. Taxpayers likely select preparers from a subset of the establishments in 
their county based on factors such as cost, location, and personal referrals. While we cannot 
                                                 
6 Where county level unemployment is unavailable, we use the state-level unemployment. We use state-level GDP 
because this information is not available at the county-level for many of the smaller counties in our sample.  
7 The ACS database only includes counties with populations above 65,000. This excludes approximately 74 percent 
of the county-years available in the SOI database. Nevertheless, our sample captures approximately 80 percent of 
U.S. taxpayers.  
8 This estimate is smaller than the average (median) 9.37 (9.47) percent Boone et al. (2013) report. When we restrict 
our sample to the 2005-2009 years covered in their study, our estimates are similar to theirs.   
9 We require each county to have at least one accounting establishment in order to compute HHI. This restriction, 
however, does not affect our primary sample.  
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observe these factors, we believe it is reasonable that more establishments increases taxpayers’ 
willingness to engage alternate providers within their pre-determined parameters.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
Among accounting establishments with less than 50 employees, the NETS dataset 
contains nearly 360,000 unique establishments (2.0 million unique establishment years) with 
identifiable county location (untabulated). These establishments have 3.5 employees on average, 
with an interquartile range of one to four.10  
Table 2 presents a correlation matrix. Our dependent variable is negatively correlated to 
each of our proxies for accounting establishment competition, counter to our hypothesis that 
increasing competition among tax preparers is associated with increased tax avoidance. The 
matrix suggests a high degree of correlation between the number of accounting establishments in 
a county and county size, though this is less of a concern when scaling the number of 
establishments by number of taxpayers.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
Table 3 presents results of our multivariate regression. Column (1) reports results 
measuring tax preparer competition as NUM_FIRMS; Column (2) shows the 
NUM_FIRMS_SCLAED measure; and Column (3) shows the HHI measure. Across each of our 
proxies, we observe a significantly positive association between tax preparer competition and 
reported county-level underreporting of income, consistent with our hypothesis. Economically, a 
ten percent increase in the number of accounting establishments is associated with a 0.8 percent 
                                                 
10 In untabulated analysis, we separately measure competition among small (i.e. one employee) and large (i.e. more 
than three employees) establishments and include competition for both sets in our model. The coefficients on these 
variables are statistically significant in both instances, but are generally bigger among the large establishments.  
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increase in under-reported income. For the average county, this represents a total decrease $7M 
in under-reported income.11 
The coefficients on our control variables are directionally consistent for the most part 
with those of Boone et al. (2013), while the explanatory power of our model is greater. We 
attribute this greater explanatory power to our inclusion of county fixed effects and additional 
macroeconomic control variables.   
IV. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
Variation in Type of Accounting Establishments 
 Federal law does not impose licensure requirements on paid preparers.12 Instead, the 
certified public accountant (“CPA”) designation, conferred by states, can signal professional 
status within the industry. We test whether competition among establishments purporting to be 
CPA firms produces differential effects on individual tax avoidance than competition among 
non-CPA establishments. Ex ante, it is unclear which establishment type would be more 
sensitive to the effects of competition. Prior research asserts CPAs have greater client loyalty 
(Cuccia 1995; Jackson et al. 1988; IRS 1987), suggesting CPA establishments may be more 
eager to appease clients and promote more tax avoidance in the face of increased competition. At 
the same time, Cuccia (1994) finds that CPAs are more conservative than non-CPAs, suggesting 
CPA establishments may be reluctant to advocate more tax avoidance in response to increased 
competition.  
                                                 
11 Multiplying 0.8 percent by the average household income in the ACS dataset ($65,679) allows us to estimate the 
average under-reported income per taxpayer. We derive county totals by multiplying this amount by the average 
number of taxpayers in a county.     
12 The IRS attempted to regulate paid preparers, but its efforts were struck down by a U.S. District Court in Loving 
v. IRS (2014).   
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 Of the nearly two million accounting establishments in our dataset, approximately 24 
percent purport to be CPA firms, determined by whether the establishment name contains the 
“CPA” acronym. We separately measure each of our competition proxies among CPA 
establishments (CPA_COMPETITION) and non-CPA establishments 
(NONCPA_COMPETITION) and include both variables in our model. 13  We present the results 
in Table 4.     
INSERT TABLE 4 
 We find that the coefficients on competition for both establishment types are universally 
positive and statistically significant across all specifications, except for NUM_FIRMS_SCALED 
among CPA establishments. Moreover, the coefficient on our variable of interest for non-CPA 
establishments is significantly greater (p<0.01) than it is for CPA establishments. From these 
results, we infer that CPA establishments, due to their more conservative approach, are less 
sensitive to the effects of competition on appeasing client preferences for tax avoidance.  
Variation in County-level Reliance on Paid Preparers 
 We expect the effect of competition on tax avoidance to be stronger in counties that rely 
more on paid preparers (as opposed to self-prepared). To proxy for county reliance on paid 
preparers, we utilize an SOI database that provides zip code level data on the number of 
individual returns filed using a paid preparer. We aggregate this information to the county-level 
in deriving the fraction of returns filed using a paid preparer. We then partition this variable at 
the sample median (54.7 percent, untabulated) and create an indicator variable, 
HIGH_PCT_PREP, equal to one for county-years that more frequently relied on paid preparers, 
                                                 
13 An implicit assumption in this test is that the market for CPA preparers is different than that of non-CPA 
preparers.  
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and zero otherwise. We interact this indicator variable with COMPETITION and present the 
results in Table 5.  
INSERT TABLE 5 
We note the coefficient on HIGH_PCT_PREP is negative and statistically significant in 
two of our specifications, suggesting that counties whose taxpayers rely more on paid preparers 
exhibit less tax avoidance.14 This reliance on paid preparers is distinct, however, from the 
construct we are testing – competition between paid preparers. Across each of our specifications, 
we observe that the coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive. By demonstrating 
that the effect of paid preparer competition on tax avoidance varies in the expected direction 
based paid preparer reliance, we believe this finding provides greater credibility to the 
interpretation of our primary results.   
Tax Avoidance Mechanisms 
 To ascertain how paid preparer competition facilitates tax avoidance, we consider three 
strategies individuals can pursue to reduce their tax liability – contribute to an individual 
retirement account (“IRA”), claim the earned income tax credit (“EITC”), or deduct charitable 
contributions.15 Importantly, these mechanisms can shed light as to whether paid preparers 
acquiesce to particularly aggressive positions desired by their clients or advocate more benign 
tax planning techniques their clients may not have been aware of. For instance, contributing to an 
IRA is a perfectly legal tax-savings strategy that meets legislative goals of encouraging 
individuals to save for retirement. To the extent competition further incentivizes paid preparers 
                                                 
14 This finding is at odds with a concurrent working paper by DeBacker et al. (2019), who use proprietary IRS data 
and find that use of paid preparers at the individual level are associated with higher audit adjustments.  
15 We acknowledge that claiming the EITC and deducting charitable contributions do not impact AGI and therefore 
will not affect the dependent variable from our primary test. In the next section, however, we find that paid preparer 
competition is also associated with lower tax liabilities, which can be attributable to EITC claims.   
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to promote strategies consistent with government intentions, we would expect to see paid 
preparer competition associated with an increased percentage of returns with IRA contributions.  
EITC claims may represent either a benign or more nefarious form of tax planning. To 
the extent paid preparers inform eligible clients about the availability of the credit, a higher take-
up of the EITC would represent a more benign form of tax avoidance. On the other hand, to the 
extent paid preparers facilitate ineligible clients claiming the credit, a higher EITC take-up would 
represent a more nefarious form of tax avoidance. The IRS (2019) estimated that improper EITC 
claims contribute to $27 billion (roughly 11 percent) of the individual under-reporting tax gap 
between 2011-2013, highlighting its potential for abuse. Charitable contributions similarly 
represent a benign form of tax planning, but the deduction may also be subject to abuse by 
taxpayers who over-claim deductions to qualified non-profit organizations or claim deductions 
for contributions to ineligible organizations.  
Table 6 Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the percentage of taxpayers who make 
IRA contributions (PCT_IRA), the percentage of low income taxpayers who claim the EITC 
(PCT_EITC), and the natural log of charitable contributions (CHARITY).16 We present results of 
the multivariate regressions in Panels B through D, which suggest paid preparer competition 
facilitates tax avoidance through each of the aforementioned mechanisms. Specifically, the 
coefficients on our proxies for COMPETITION are significantly positively associated with 
PCT_IRA in two of the specifications and are significantly positively associated with PCT_EITC 
and CHARITY in all three specifications. Based on these results, we are unable to definitely 
conclude whether paid preparer competition facilitates tax avoidance in a more benign or 
                                                 
16 We aggregate data at the zip code level available through the IRS SOI database for each of these measures. IRA 
contribution data is only available for 2004 through 2006 and 2013. The number of taxpayers claiming the EITC 
credit is not available in 2008. As the IRS SOI data is disaggregated by income buckets, we only consider taxpayers 
with reported AGI less than $50,000 for our this analysis.  
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nefarious manner. While the IRA contribution results suggest paid preparers advancing client 
interests in a manner intended by the government, the results on EITC claims and charitable 
contributions allows for the possibility that paid preparers may be acting less skeptically or 
promoting aggressive positions in order to satisfy client preferences for paying less tax.      
INSERT TABLE 6 
Alternate measures of tax avoidance 
Although UNDERREPORT intends to capture income not reported to the IRS, it fails to 
capture tax-reducing positions on reported income. To address this, along with the previously 
mentioned shortcomings of this measure, we construct two alternate proxies intended to capture 
tax avoidance that do not rely on ACS data. The first, borrowing from literature that treats the 
level of tax as a proxy for tax avoidance (e.g. Slemrod et al. 2001), is the natural log of the 
average tax liability in a county. We obtain tax liability information at the zip-code level from 
the zip-code level SOI database and aggregate this data to the county level.17 This proxy, TAX, 
captures avoidance through exclusions of gross income (i.e. business income), larger deductions 
(e.g., moving expenses; charitable contributions), and larger tax credits (e.g. research and 
development credit; earned income credit) allowed during our sample period. A drawback to this 
proxy is that it does not account for the income-based effects of tax. To alleviate this concern, 
our second alternate proxy borrows from the corporate tax avoidance literature (e.g. Dyreng et al. 
2008) and scales cumulative reported tax at the county level by cumulative AGI at the county 
level. This effective tax rate, ETR, reflects the tax liability per given dollar of income and 
captures avoidance through larger itemized deductions or tax credits.18 A drawback to this 
                                                 
17 The tax liability proxy includes non-income taxes (i.e. self-employment tax) reported on Form 1040. Income tax 
liability specifically is not available in the SOI database prior to 2007.  
18 We multiply ETR by 100 to facilitate interpretation of the coefficient in our model.  
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measure is that it does not capture underreporting of AGI. Both TAX and ETR are decreasing in 
tax avoidance.  
By relaxing the requirement for ACS data, we expand our sample to 27,107 unique 
county-years. We present descriptives of TAX and ETR, as well as the explanatory model 
variables, in Panel A of Table 7.19 
INSERT TABLE 7 
The average (median) unlogged county-level tax reported in our sample is $4,944 
($4,331) while the average (median) ETR is 10.4 (10.0) percent, respectively. Because we 
measure our variables as averages at the county level, we do not observe as drastic variation as 
we might if we could measure these variables at the individual level.20 Predictably, the expansion 
of the dataset to include smaller counties results in a sample with fewer accounting 
establishments (63 on average), lower AGI ($46,003 on average), and fewer taxpayers (39,253 
on average).  
Panel B of Table 7 presents results from estimation of our model on this sample. 
Columns (1), (3), and (5) use TAX as our proxy for tax avoidance, while Columns (2), (4), and 
(6) use ETR. The coefficients on our proxies for competition are negative across all six 
specifications and statistically significant when measured as NUM_FIRMS and 
NUM_FIRMS_SCALED. Collectively, our results indicate that paid preparer competition 
facilitates both underreporting of income and avoidance of tax on reported income.  
Demand-based explanation for tax avoidance 
                                                 
19 We exclude demographic characteristics including MARRIED, ELDERLY, EDUCATION, POVERTY, and AGE 
because they are collected from the ACS database.  
20 For instance, the average tax within a county in the 95th percentile is $9,541. By contrast, the average tax among 
individuals in the 95th percentile in 2013 was $41,704 (IRS 2013).  
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 An alternate explanation for the association between paid preparer competition and 
individual tax avoidance is that paid preparers choose to operate in counties whose taxpayers 
have greater opportunities or demand for tax avoidance. To address this demand-side 
explanation, we control for the percentage of a county’s taxpayers who report sole proprietorship 
income on Schedule C of the tax return. As business income is more difficult for the IRS to 
verify and is subject to considerable discretion (i.e., deductions for ordinary and necessary 
business expenses), we expect the opportunities for tax avoidance, and hence the demand for 
paid preparers, to be greater in counties with a higher percentage of sole proprietorships.  
 In untabulated analysis, we create an indicator variable equal to one where the percentage 
of returns with Schedule C business income is greater than the sample median.21 The coefficient 
on COMPETITION remains positive and statistically significant across all three models when 
controlling for counties whose taxpayers have more opportunities for tax avoidance. Overall, this 
result supports our theory that the supply of paid preparers produces competition in the 
marketplace that facilitates individual tax avoidance. When we interact this Schedule C indicator 
variable with our competition proxies, the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically 
insignificant, suggesting potential opportunities for tax avoidance do not incrementally affect the 
relation between paid preparer competition and tax avoidance. We further note the coefficient on 
the main effect of the Schedule C indicator variable is also statistically insignificant.       
V. CONCLUSION 
In this study, we examine how competition in the paid preparer market impacts individual 
taxpayer avoidance. Using the National Employment Time Series (“NETS”) database that 
identifies the number the number of accounting establishments, as well as the number of 
                                                 
21 We omit 2008 from this sample because information on the number of Schedule C filers is not available in the 
IRS SOI database for this year.  
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employees working at those establishments, we construct county-level measures of paid preparer 
competition. Merging this dataset to the IRS SOI database and U.S. Census ACS survey 
database, we find that increased competition is associated with more underreporting of income at 
the county-level. These results, consistent with paid preparer supply rather than taxpayer demand 
for tax avoidance, suggest competition intensifies concerns about satisfying client reporting 
preferences. Our results are stronger among non-CPA establishments and in counties that utilize 
paid preparers more frequently. Finally, our results are robust to alternate measures of tax 
avoidance that overcome shortcomings in our primary measure. We believe these findings 
should be of interest to policymakers who consider the costs and benefits of imposing restrictions 
on paid preparers that might curtail competition in the industry.   
We acknowledge at least two caveats to our study. First, tax reporting decisions are made 
by individuals in consultation with their paid preparers. Because we do not have access to 
individual tax returns, we measure tax avoidance using data aggregated at the county-level. We 
believe future research using individual-level data from the IRS can provide more granular 
insights into the relation between competition and tax avoidance. Second, our proxies for tax 
avoidance do not necessarily indicate paid preparers are making legally impermissible 
recommendations. Our results examining IRA contributions, EITC claims, and charitable 
contribution deductions suggest the mechanisms facilitating this tax avoidance include both 
benign and more aggressive forms of tax planning. We encourage future research to continue to 
think carefully about how to best measure individual tax avoidance.  
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Appendix: 
 
Variable Definitions 
UNDERREPORT= Aggregate county-wide household income from the U.S. 
Census Bureau ACS survey less aggregate countywide income 
from the IRS, scaled by household income from the U.S. 
Census Bureau 
 
NUM_FIRMS= Natural log of one plus the number of accounting 
establishments in a county 
 
NUM_FIRMS_SCALED= Number of accounting establishments scaled by number of tax 
returns filed in a county 
 
HHI= Herfindahl index of accounting establishment market 
concentration, where market share is the percentage of 
employees in a county at a given establishment. The sum of the 
squared market shares determines the county’s market 
concentration. This concentration is multiplied by -1.  
 
INCOME= Natural log of the average taxpayer’s adjusted gross income 
(“AGI”) in a county 
 
NUM_TAXPAYERS= Natural log of the number of tax returns filed in a county 
 
MARRIED= Percentage of population in a county that is married, per the 
U.S. Census Bureau ACS survey 
 
ELDERLY= Percentage of population in a county over age 70, per the U.S. 
Census Bureau ACS survey 
 
EDUCATION= Percentage of population in a county with at least a bachelor’s 
degree, per the U.S. Census Bureau ACS Survey 
 
POVERTY= Percentage of population in a county living in poverty, per the 
U.S. Census Bureau ACS Survey 
 
AGE= 
 
Median age of the county population, per the U.S. Census 
Bureau ACS Survey 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT= Unemployment rate in the county, per the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
 
GDP= Natural log of GDP in the state, per the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
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HIGH_PCT_PREP= Indicator variable equal to one if the percentage of filed returns 
that use a third party paid preparer in a county is above the 
sample median, and zero otherwise 
 
PCT_IRA= Percentage of taxpayers in a county who contribute to an 
Individual Retirement Account (“IRA”)  
 
PCT_EITC= Percentage of low-income (AGI<$50,000) taxpayers in a 
county who claim the earned income tax credit 
 
CHARITY= Natural log of charitable contributions claimed as an itemized 
deduction by taxpayers in a county 
 
TAX= Natural log of the average taxpayer’s tax liability in a county 
 
ETR= Cumulative tax liability in a county scaled by cumulative AGI 
reported in a county, multiplied by 100 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev 5th Pctl 10th Pctl 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 90th Pctl 95th Pctl 
UNDER_REPORT 0.051 0.108 -0.125 -0.071 -0.002 0.061 0.119 0.168 0.198 
NUM_FIRMS (unlogged) 230 363 32 39 55 96 235 572 906 
NUM_FIRMS 4.804 1.025 3.497 3.689 4.025 4.575 5.464 6.351 6.810 
NUM_FIRMS_SCALED 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
HHI -0.034 0.027 -0.088 -0.069 -0.048 -0.029 -0.013 -0.005 -0.004 
INCOME (unlogged) 
          
54,216  
          
13,473  
          
38,520  
          
40,876  
          
45,202  
          
51,142  
          
59,661  
          
71,264  
          
82,291  
INCOME 10.874 0.225 10.559 10.618 10.719 10.842 10.996 11.174 11.318 
NUM_TAXPAYERS 
(unlogged) 
        
133,618  
        
174,902  
          
28,455  
          
31,371  
          
40,777  
          
67,010  
        
139,870  
        
317,422  
        
464,163  
NUM_TAXPAYERS 11.323 0.888 10.256 10.354 10.616 11.113 11.848 12.668 13.048 
MARRIED 0.509 0.061 0.398 0.430 0.472 0.512 0.552 0.582 0.602 
ELDERLY 0.092 0.026 0.055 0.062 0.075 0.090 0.105 0.122 0.138 
EDUCATION 0.264 0.097 0.135 0.153 0.190 0.249 0.318 0.400 0.455 
POVERTY 0.141 0.055 0.058 0.070 0.102 0.138 0.176 0.212 0.238 
AGE 37.334 4.036 30.300 32.200 34.900 37.400 39.900 42.200 43.900 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.070 0.028 0.035 0.039 0.049 0.066 0.087 0.106 0.119 
GDP 12.780 0.904 11.026 11.542 12.296 12.880 13.330 14.022 14.385 
 
Notes: All model variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent and are defined in the appendix.  
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 UNDERREPORT - -0.216 -0.082 -0.165 -0.515 -0.219 0.002 0.008 -0.296 0.149 -0.071 0.049 -0.044 
2 NUM_FIRMS -0.194 - 0.563 0.809 0.438 0.957 -0.248 -0.087 0.489 -0.108 -0.045 -0.015 0.219 
3 NUM_FIRMS_SCALED -0.043 0.583 - 0.525 0.308 0.308 -0.144 0.096 0.357 0.014 0.075 -0.019 0.037 
4 HHI -0.184 0.947 0.559 - 0.379 0.742 -0.162 -0.060 0.419 -0.121 -0.015 -0.018 0.138 
5 INCOME -0.484 0.430 0.257 0.429 - 0.400 0.242 -0.191 0.793 -0.640 0.083 -0.345 0.079 
6 NUM_TAXPAYERS -0.219 0.934 0.286 0.884 0.426 - -0.233 -0.136 0.442 -0.135 -0.078 -0.015 0.242 
7 MARRIED -0.005 -0.245 -0.173 -0.204 0.217 -0.205 - 0.046 -0.054 -0.619 0.278 -0.209 -0.065 
8 ELDERLY 0.032 -0.130 0.054 -0.147 -0.245 -0.181 -0.005 - -0.280 0.059 0.781 0.182 0.086 
9 EDUCATION -0.292 0.532 0.359 0.507 0.785 0.497 -0.049 -0.294 - -0.378 -0.131 -0.329 -0.030 
10 POVERTY 0.178 -0.113 0.048 -0.126 -0.650 -0.176 -0.600 0.100 -0.404 - -0.287 0.404 0.029 
11 AGE -0.057 -0.086 0.028 -0.075 0.024 -0.108 0.243 0.785 -0.130 -0.242 - 0.149 0.063 
12 UNEMPLOYMENT 0.028 -0.012 -0.006 -0.005 -0.343 -0.023 -0.237 0.203 -0.312 0.408 0.179 - 0.200 
13 GDP -0.046 0.196 0.023 0.199 0.048 0.221 -0.074 0.103 -0.035 0.001 0.108 0.182 - 
 
Notes: Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are presented above (below) the diagonal. All coefficients significant at p<0.10 are in bold. All variables are 
winsorized at 1 and 99 percent and are defined in the appendix.  
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Table 3 
Relation between Tax Preparer Competition and Individual Tax Avoidance 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
COMPETITION= NUM_FIRMS NUM_FIRMS_SCALED HHI 
 Y=UNDER_REPORT Y=UNDER_REPORT Y=UNDER_REPORT 
        
COMPETITION 0.08*** 51.11*** 0.79*** 
 (4.83) (4.09) (4.39) 
INCOME -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.83*** 
 (-26.49) (-26.24) (-26.89) 
NUM_TAXPAYERS -0.61*** -0.53*** -0.57*** 
 (-15.35) (-13.49) (-14.75) 
MARRIED 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 
 (11.29) (11.23) (11.37) 
ELDERLY -0.81*** -0.82*** -0.83*** 
 (-3.92) (-3.92) (-4.03) 
EDUCATION 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.74*** 
 (11.39) (11.41) (11.58) 
POVERTY -0.49*** -0.49*** -0.49*** 
 (-10.31) (-10.38) (-10.21) 
AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1.26) (1.33) (1.23) 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.47*** 
 (-4.74) (-4.73) (-4.98) 
GDP 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 
 (8.42) (8.36) (7.83) 
CONSTANT 11.33*** 10.68*** 11.54*** 
 (19.51) (17.67) (19.84) 
    
Observations 7,115 7,115 7,115 
Fixed Effects County&Yr County&Yr County&Yr 
Clustered SEs County County County 
Adjusted R-squared 0.785 0.785 0.784 
 
Notes: NUM_FIRMS is the test variable in Columns (1); NUM_FIRMS_SCALED is the test variable in Column (2). 
HHI is the test variable in Column (3). All variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics are presented below each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using two-tailed p-values. 
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Table 4 
CPA and non-CPA Establishments 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
COMPETITION= NUM_FIRMS NUM_FIRMS_SCALED HHI 
 Y=UNDER_REPORT Y=UNDER_REPORT Y=UNDER_REPORT 
        
CPA_COMPETITION 0.01* 25.69 0.10*** 
 (1.83) (1.05) (3.50) 
NONCPA_COMPETITION 0.06*** 62.08*** 0.56*** 
 (4.39) (4.49) (3.90) 
INCOME -0.82*** -0.81*** -0.83*** 
 (-26.41) (-26.16) (-26.73) 
NUM_TAXPAYERS -0.61*** -0.53*** -0.56*** 
 (-15.37) (-13.31) (-14.78) 
MARRIED 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 
 (11.28) (11.27) (11.32) 
ELDERLY -0.81*** -0.81*** -0.84*** 
 (-3.89) (-3.87) (-4.08) 
EDUCATION 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 
 (11.43) (11.48) (11.55) 
POVERTY -0.49*** -0.49*** -0.48*** 
 (-10.31) (-10.39) (-10.02) 
AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1.25) (1.31) (1.14) 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.47*** -0.48*** -0.44*** 
 (-4.80) (-4.92) (-4.56) 
GDP 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 
 (8.37) (8.38) (8.12) 
CONSTANT 11.34*** 10.59*** 11.41*** 
 (19.52) (17.42) (19.75) 
    
Observations 7,115 7,115 7,112 
Fixed Effects County&Yr County&Yr County&Yr 
Clustered SEs County County County 
Adjusted R2 0.784 0.785 0.785 
 
Notes: NUM_FIRMS is the test variable in Columns (1); NUM_FIRMS_SCALED is the test variable in Column (2). 
HHI is the test variable in Column (3). All variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics are presented below each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using two-tailed p-values. 
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Table 5 
Reliance on Paid Preparer Cross Section 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
COMPETITION= NUM_FIRMS NUM_FIRMS_SCALED HHI 
 Y=UNDER_REPORT Y=UNDER_REPORT Y=UNDER_REPORT 
        
COMPETITION 0.07*** 40.39*** 0.65*** 
 (4.54) (3.37) (3.44) 
HIGH_PCT_PREP -0.06*** -0.03*** 0.00 
 (-3.71) (-4.04) (0.94) 
COMPETITION*HIGH_PCT_PREP 0.01*** 20.41*** 0.18* 
 (3.52) (4.06) (1.90) 
INCOME -0.82*** -0.81*** -0.83*** 
 (-26.27) (-26.18) (-26.82) 
NUM_TAXPAYERS -0.60*** -0.53*** -0.56*** 
 (-15.29) (-13.25) (-14.59) 
MARRIED 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 
 (11.41) (11.28) (11.40) 
ELDERLY -0.82*** -0.81*** -0.83*** 
 (-4.01) (-3.92) (-4.06) 
EDUCATION 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 
 (11.42) (11.31) (11.56) 
POVERTY -0.48*** -0.49*** -0.48*** 
 (-10.28) (-10.42) (-10.27) 
AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (1.00) (1.17) (1.16) 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.47*** -0.46*** -0.47*** 
 (-4.76) (-4.65) (-4.94) 
GDP 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 
 (8.28) (8.40) (7.80) 
CONSTANT 11.33*** 10.61*** 11.51*** 
 (19.65) (17.54) (19.85) 
    
Observations 7,115 7,115 7,115 
Fixed Effects County&Yr County&Yr County&Yr 
Clustered SEs County County County 
Adjusted R2 0.786 0.786 0.785 
 
Notes: NUM_FIRMS is the test variable in Columns (1); NUM_FIRMS_SCALED is the test variable in Column (2). 
HHI is the test variable in Column (3). All variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics are presented below each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using two-tailed p-values. 
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Table 6 
Tax Avoidance Mechanisms 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 5th Pctl 
10th 
Pctl 
25th 
Pctl 
50th 
Pctl 
75th 
Pctl 
90th 
Pctl 
95th 
Pctl 
PCT_IRA 2,357 0.021 0.006 0.011 0.013 0.016 0.020 0.024 0.029 0.032 
PCT_EITC 6,335 0.181 0.064 0.087 0.105 0.135 0.173 0.219 0.267 0.301 
CHARITY 7,115 18.275 1.106 16.738 17.011 17.469 18.064 18.939 19.895 20.466 
 
Panel B: IRA Contributions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
COMPETITION= NUM_FIRMS NUM_FIRMS_SCALED HHI 
 Y=PCT_IRA Y= PCT_IRA Y= PCT_IRA 
        
COMPETITION 0.00*** 1.46*** -0.00 
 (2.87) (3.31) (-0.24) 
INCOME 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 
 (2.36) (2.39) (1.93) 
NUM_TAXPAYERS 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.18) (1.89) (1.90) 
MARRIED -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.04) (-0.01) (-0.16) 
ELDERLY -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.21) (-0.17) (-0.29) 
EDUCATION -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.64) (-0.53) (-0.57) 
POVERTY 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.47) (0.43) (0.55) 
AGE -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (-3.25) (-3.23) (-3.09) 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.02 -0.02 -0.02* 
 (-1.50) (-1.54) (-1.67) 
GDP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-1.13) (-0.95) (-1.57) 
CONSTANT 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
 (0.02) (-0.76) (0.07) 
    
Observations 2,357 2,357 2,357 
Fixed Effects County&Yr County&Yr City&Yr 
Clustered SEs County County City 
Adjusted R-squared 0.954 0.954 0.953 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Tax Avoidance Mechanisms 
 
Panel C: EITC Claims 
  (1) (2) (3) 
COMPETITION= NUM_FIRMS NUM_FIRMS_SCALED HHI 
 Y=PCT_EITC Y= PCT_EITC Y= PCT_EITC 
        
COMPETITION 0.02*** 13.62*** 0.12*** 
 (4.43) (4.84) (2.59) 
INCOME -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (-0.57) (-0.34) (-0.73) 
NUM_TAXPAYERS -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (-10.24) (-6.19) (-7.57) 
MARRIED 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (1.19) (1.16) (1.24) 
ELDERLY 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) 
EDUCATION 0.02 0.02* 0.02* 
 (1.58) (1.72) (1.88) 
POVERTY 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
 (4.41) (4.44) (4.57) 
AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.33) (0.51) (0.55) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 
 (1.75) (1.75) (1.86) 
GDP -0.02** -0.02** -0.02*** 
 (-2.55) (-2.41) (-2.91) 
CONSTANT 1.15*** 0.96*** 1.15*** 
 (10.13) (8.30) (9.95) 
    
Observations 6,335 6,335 6,335 
Fixed Effects County&Yr County&Yr City&Yr 
Clustered SEs County County City 
Adjusted R-squared 0.981 0.981 0.981 
35 
 
Table 6 (continued) 
Tax Avoidance Mechanisms 
 
Panel D: Charitable Contribution Deductions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
COMPETITION= NUM_FIRMS NUM_FIRMS_SCALED HHI 
 Y=CHARITY Y= CHARITY Y= CHARITY 
        
COMPETITION 0.12* 44.39*** 1.30** 
 (1.82) (2.66) (2.09) 
INCOME 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.61*** 
 (9.15) (9.18) (9.10) 
NUM_TAXPAYERS 0.50*** 0.60*** 0.57*** 
 (14.07) (9.08) (10.01) 
MARRIED -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 
 (-1.27) (-1.27) (-1.23) 
ELDERLY 0.38 0.38 0.35 
 (1.21) (1.21) (1.09) 
EDUCATION -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
 (-0.32) (-0.17) (-0.20) 
POVERTY -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 
 (-4.95) (-5.13) (-5.10) 
AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.28) (0.41) (0.25) 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.94*** -0.93*** -0.93*** 
 (-5.63) (-5.74) (-5.76) 
GDP 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.16** 
 (3.30) (2.91) (2.51) 
CONSTANT 3.60*** 3.02*** 3.78*** 
 (4.05) (3.35) (4.21) 
    
Observations 7,115 7,115 7,115 
Fixed Effects County&Yr County&Yr City&Yr 
Clustered SEs County County City 
Adjusted R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.996 
 Notes: NUM_FIRMS is the test variable in Columns (1); NUM_FIRMS_SCALED is the test variable in Column (2). 
HHI is the test variable in Column (3). All variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics are presented below each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using two-tailed p-values. 
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Table 7 
Alternate measures of tax avoidance 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev 5th Pctl 10th Pctl 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl 90th Pctl 95th Pctl 
TAX (unlogged) 
          
4,944  
       
2,375  
          
2,512  
          
2,831  
          
3,438  
          
4,331  
          
5,707  
          
7,637  
            
9,541  
TAX 8.418 0.403 7.829 7.948 8.143 8.374 8.649 8.941 9.163 
ETR 10.375 1.953 7.745 8.214 9.031 10.045 11.393 12.960 14.145 
NUM_FIRMS (unlogged) 62.874 153.992 2.000 3.000 6.000 14.000 41.000 134.000 312.000 
NUM_FIRMS 2.948 1.392 1.099 1.386 1.946 2.708 3.738 4.905 5.746 
NUM_FIRMS_SCALED 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 
HHI -0.200 0.223 -0.662 -0.500 -0.250 -0.128 -0.057 -0.022 -0.010 
INCOME (unlogged) 
       
46,003  
     
11,574  
       
31,722  
       
34,173  
       
38,403  
       
43,784  
       
50,892  
       
59,906  
          
68,481  
INCOME 
       
10.709  
       
0.230  
       
10.365  
       
10.439  
       
10.556  
       
10.687  
       
10.837  
       
11.001  
         
11.134  
NUM_TAXPAYERS 
(unlogged) 
       
39,253  
     
84,866  
          
1,631  
          
2,543  
          
4,947  
       
11,180  
       
29,309  
       
89,252  
       
190,036  
NUM_TAXPAYERS 
         
9.479  
       
1.385  
         
7.397  
         
7.841  
         
8.507  
         
9.322  
       
10.286  
       
11.399  
         
12.155  
UNEMPLOYMENT 
         
0.071  
       
0.030  
         
0.032  
         
0.037  
         
0.047  
         
0.065  
         
0.089  
         
0.112  
            
0.127  
GDP 
       
12.433  
       
0.972  
       
10.651  
       
11.065  
       
11.828  
       
12.452  
       
12.997  
       
13.900  
         
14.033  
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Table 7 (continued) 
Alternate measures of tax avoidance 
 
Panel B: Multivariate results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COMPETITION= NUM_FIRMS NUM_FIRMS_SCALED HHI 
 Y= TAX Y=ETR Y= TAX Y=ETR Y= TAX Y=ETR 
              
COMPETITION -0.03*** -0.12*** -16.18*** -72.46*** -0.00 -0.05 
 (-5.25) (-3.12) (-4.17) (-2.93) (-0.06) (-0.71) 
INCOME 1.21*** 5.81*** 1.21*** 5.81*** 1.22*** 5.82*** 
 (32.11) (23.61) (32.08) (23.59) (32.19) (23.69) 
NUM_TAXPAYERS -1.58*** 0.93*** -1.58*** 0.83*** -1.58*** 0.88*** 
 (-17.67) (5.28) (-17.67) (4.78) (-17.60) (5.17) 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.05** -6.73*** -0.08*** -6.74*** -0.07*** -6.75*** 
 (-2.44) (-12.24) (-3.49) (-12.26) (-2.91) (-12.26) 
GDP 0.25*** 0.61*** 0.25*** 0.62*** 0.26*** 0.64*** 
 (9.19) (3.16) (9.19) (3.17) (9.38) (3.28) 
CONSTANT -6.98*** -68.52*** -6.84*** -67.85*** -7.08*** -68.93*** 
 (-16.63) (-22.78) (-16.02) (-22.37) (-16.88) (-23.04) 
       
Observations 27,107 27,107 27,107 27,107 27,107 27,107 
Fixed Effects County&Yr County&Yr County&Yr County&Yr County&Yr County&Yr 
Clustered SEs County County County County County County 
Adjusted R2 0.969 0.938 0.969 0.938 0.969 0.937 
 
Notes: NUM_FIRMS is the test variable in Columns (1) and (2); NUM_FIRMS_SCALED is the test variable in Columns (3) and (4). HHI is the test variable in 
Columns (5) and (6). All variables are defined in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics are presented 
below each coefficient. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively using two-tailed p-values.
